The Assassination of Fakhrizadeh and the prospects of US-led diplomacy
The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh has escalated tensions between Iran, Israel, and its Western allies. Many are beginning to debate what this could mean for the future of Western-Iranian relations, but how far has it really changed the Iranian response to the West?
The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh has escalated tensions between Iran, Israel, and its Western allies. Many have begun to debate what this could mean for the future of Western-Iranian relations, but how far has it really changed the Iranian response to the West?
“...no crime, no terror and no stupid act will go unanswered by the Iranian people”
- Defence Minister General Amir Hatami in a speech given at Fakhrizadeh’s funeral. [1]
On the 27th of November, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a top Iranian Physicist, was assassinated in Damavand, just east of Tehran.
His low-profile in the public sphere was by no means a reflection of the influence he had over Iran's nuclear programme. With years of experience behind him as a nuclear scientist, Fakhrizadeh played an important role in shaping and directing it; so much so that for years his name was exchanged between Western and Israeli officials who were sceptical of Iranian motivations behind its uranium enrichment aimed to uphold ‘legitimate rights to peaceful nuclear technology’. [2]
“Remember his name.” [3]
Based on the presumption that Iran is heading a covert nuclear weapons operation, Fakhrizadeh had been singled out as a serious threat to Israel in Netanyahu’s 2018 presentation on a collection of ‘secret documents’ from Iran's atomic archives, which he claimed incriminated Fakhrizadeh in a plot to create nuclear weapons [4]. The audience was told to “remember his name,” as slides honed into his assertion that Fakhrizadeh headed ‘SPND’, an Iranian organisation aimed at furthering Iran’s nuclear ambitions, by “preserving nuclear knowhow” for use in a not too distant future.
Though Israel has not yet confirmed or denied the attack, it is no surprise then that fingers have pointed to them, not only considering its increasing surveillance of Iranian nuclear scientists in recent years, but it's track record of Mossad-led assassinations of them. Fakhrizadeh’s killing in particular followed the pattern of these assassinations which have persisted since 2007, where 6 Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed, and one seriously injured under unknown circumstances [5]. Almost identical methods of attack leave a trail of similarities that link most of these assassinations together under the banner of Mossad-led operations - the implications of which cannot be ignored.
An assessment of the potential outcomes
This assassination has exacerbated a number of pre-existing issues, which were thought to be rectified under Biden’s presidency; the prospects of which now seem bleak. It was thought that a Biden administration would ease the tensions between Iran, Israel and the wider international community, which had reached new heights under Trump’s instigations; but how far has Fakhrizadeh's assassination really affected the trajectory of US-Iranian diplomatic relations?
A commonly held view is that the assassination has likely sabotaged the prospects of diplomacy with Iran; a door which could have been opened again by Biden’s administration. However, it is hardly likely that Iran would be open to such diplomacy, considering the recent US-led assassination of top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani. This factor alone has not only made Iran view the US with a greater level of scepticism than ever before, but has contributed to a host of bolder retaliations, including the missile attacks of US airbases in January. This may shed some doubt over the belief that the assassination of Fakhrizadeh has significantly worsened or changed the direction of Iranian hostilities, as diplomatic ties had already been severed long before.
Biden’s statement in response to Soleimani’s assassination earlier this year was no more promising, as it endorsed the Trump administration's view of Soleimani as a terrorist, whose death ‘should not be mourned’. As Biden embarks on his new role as President of the US, this response will likely live in the memory of the Iranian general public and policy makers, who were outraged by Soleimani’s assassination, which would make the prospects of Iran considering diplomatic relations with the Biden administration questionable to begin with.
It may also prove useful to ask ourselves what diplomacy really means for a Biden administration, and to what extent they share their terms of ‘diplomacy’ with Iran. Considering Biden’s staunch adherence to Zionism and enthusiastic support for an Israeli-US alliance, an achievement of any form of diplomacy with Iran may likely rest on an expectation of Iran to respect Israel's presence in the Middle East, their attacks on their nuclear scientists, and their own nuclear capabilities, which are all terms Iran would be unlikely to accept. If Biden's administration produces the same posture as Trump’s on key issues for Iran, diplomacy is unlikely, as well as the expectation that Iran may change its attitude towards the US in response to a change of administration. The terms of diplomacy for one are not the same for the other, and this reality is one to consider when trying to estimate the prospects of diplomacy among two hostile entities.
Many of the perspectives on Fakhrizadeh’s assassination seem to be rooted in a belief that Iran will follow a similar pattern to other countries, by viewing a change of administration as an opportunity for a new kind of relationship. Though this may have been the case in the past, as the US produces more unilateral approaches on key sources of conflict with Iran, it is likely that Iran will remain indifferent to changes, so long as these new administrations begin to resemble their predecessors.
Even with these factors in mind, there is no denying that if not diplomacy, continued provocation of this sort will impede on any other solution to hostilities, by pushing Iran to carry out harsher retaliations which some predict may result in all out conflict. Though Fakhrizadeh’s assassination has mounted on existing tensions, seeds of distrust had already been sown long before this, making it unlikely to effect the perceived prospects of diplomacy under Biden’s administration; prospects which were doomed to begin with.
References:
'‘Mohsen Fakhrizadeh: Iran scientist “killed by remote-controlled weapon,’’’ (2020), BBC, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-55128970>
S. H. Mousavian & M. M. Mousavian, ‘Building on the Iran Nuclear Deal for International Peace and Security,’ (2018), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/25751654.2017.1420373?needAccess=true>
ibid.
Mehdi Jedinia, ‘History of Assassinations of Iran's Top Nuclear Scientists,’ (2020), <https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/history-assassinations-irans-top-nuclear-scientists>